Green Hydrogen and New Trans-Mediterranean Dynamics: Shaping the Future of Euro-Mediterranean Energy Relations
The Euro-Mediterranean energy landscape is undergoing a profound transformation as green hydrogen emerges as a strategic pillar in Europe’s post-Russian gas era. The policy report explores the geopolitical, technical, and economic dimensions of this transition, assessing both the opportunities for industrial development and the challenges of regulatory uncertainty, infrastructure constraints, and financial dependence on external investors. It highlights the risk of replacing fossil fuel dependency with new forms of energy asymmetry, emphasizing the need for balanced partnerships that promote technology transfer, local manufacturing, and sustainable economic growth rather than reinforcing resource-export models. With Europe’s hydrogen demand projected to surge, the report underscores the urgency of regulatory alignment, infrastructure investment, and market stabilization mechanisms to ensure a secure and competitive Euro-Mediterranean hydrogen economy. It concludes with policy recommendations aimed at strengthening regional coordination, financing frameworks, and strategic planning, positioning the Mediterranean as a global hub for the hydrogen transition.
The European energy transition is undergoing a profound transformation, marking a decisive shift in Euro-Mediterranean energy relations. With the complete cessation of Russian gas transit through Ukraine in January 2025[1], Europe has definitively turned the page on its historical dependence on Russian energy imports, which had already declined dramatically from 40% in 2021 to approximately 8% in 2023. This radical transformation of Europe’s energy landscape has led to a strategic diversification of supply sources, with Norway emerging as the leading supplier (30% of EU imports) and the United States becoming the largest provider of LNG (50% of total EU LNG imports in 2023).[2] Amidst this landscape, countries in North Africa and the Middle East (MENA) region have strengthened their position, collectively providing nearly 20% of Europe’s gas imports.
Despite efforts to reduce consumption—evidenced by a 13% decrease in household gas use between 2021 and 2022—Europe’s persistent reliance on gas imports, with over 30% of EU households still dependent on gas for heating, underscores the need for a fundamental reimagining of Euro-Mediterranean energy partnerships. The traditional energy relationship between Europe and its southern neighbours, while providing crucial energy security for Europe, has contributed to the development of rent-based economies in the MENA region. According to the World Bank (2023), while fossil fuels constitute approximately 50% of total exports in the MENA region, they generate less than 2% of overall employment and minimal technological spillovers, leaving these economies vulnerable to volatile global energy markets and constraining their ability to invest in more sustainable and labour-intensive industries.
In this context, green hydrogen is emerging as a crucial alternative to traditional oil and gas in the energy transition mix, offering a pathway to sustainable decarbonization. The MENA region holds immense potential for green hydrogen development, with approximately 63 green and low-carbon hydrogen projects currently in various stages of planning and development. Recent investment trends support these prospects: renewable energy accounted for half of all foreign direct investment in Africa in 2023, totalling US$83 billion, with landmark projects like Mauritania’s US$34 billion UAE-funded green hydrogen initiative demonstrating the region’s emerging role in the global energy transition.[3] As of December 2023, countries like Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Oman, and Egypt are leading this transformation, with 31 new projects, predominantly focused on green hydrogen, launched in 2023 alone.[4] This burgeoning sector represents not just a technological solution for European decarbonization but emerges as a potential catalyst for economic and social transformation on both sides of the Mediterranean, offering opportunities for skilled job creation, technology transfer, and industrial diversification. The European Green Deal, launched in 2019 and aiming at making Europe the first climate-neutral continent by 2050, sets the stage for this transformation.
This policy report analyses the geopolitical, technical, and economic implications of this transition, highlighting how green hydrogen can evolve from a simple energy carrier to a tool for strategic partnership, capable of promoting more balanced and sustainable development in the Euro-Mediterranean region.
The Mediterranean geopolitical context is characterized by two parallel and interrelated dynamics. While the recent energy market disruptions have intensified global competition for traditional hydrocarbons, the imperative of energy transition has simultaneously sparked a race for leadership in green technologies. The South Mediterranean, with its abundant solar and wind resources, is ideally placed to play a major role in the development of alternative energy, particularly in the field of green hydrogen. The use of cheap electricity produced by solar, and wind would make electrolysis, through which hydrogen is produced, more cost-effective. According to recent estimates, countries from the Middle Eastern region could export over 13 MtH2eq by 2030, equivalent to half of European domestic production, making green hydrogen pivotal to the EU’s decarbonization strategy.[5] However, this transition requires significant financial investments and a coordinated commitment between governments, businesses, and international institutions to overcome the technical and logistical challenges.[6]
The shift to green hydrogen not only has the potential to reshape regional economies but is also likely to increase the southern Mediterranean’s geopolitical weight. Countries with abundant renewable resources are poised to become green hydrogen leaders, reshaping global energy dynamics. The UAE in particular has emerged as an exceptionally active player, with ambitions to capture 25% of the global hydrogen market by 2050, backed by substantial investments across Africa through companies like AMEA Power and Masdar.[7] This shift will create new geoeconomic centres of power and drive competition among nations to lead in hydrogen technology and production. For example, according to its national strategy, Egypt aims to reach a green hydrogen production capacity of 5 million tons per year by 2030.[8] Similarly, Morocco, with over 35 GW of renewable energy capacity expected by 2030, is planning to export up to 4 million tons of green hydrogen by 2040.[9]
This transformation is complicated by the growing rivalry of global powers in the Mediterranean region. While European initiatives aim to strengthen trans-Mediterranean energy connectivity, other global actors are increasingly present in the region’s energy infrastructure development. China, for instance, is embarking on a fresh investment drive in North Africa, particularly in renewable energy and electric vehicle (EV) projects, with some initiatives aimed at using North African countries as an export base to Europe.[10] This new investment push could influence the development of strategic energy infrastructure. The development of green hydrogen infrastructure thus requires careful consideration of partnership strategies to ensure mutual benefits and avoid creating complex dependencies that extend beyond the Euro-Mediterranean relationship. In this context, the EU should consider a strategy of “co-opetition” with the UAE, balancing competition in areas where Europe maintains comparative advantages with cooperation in areas of mutual interest, particularly in developing green hydrogen corridors between Africa and Europe.[11]
2.1. Shifting Power Dynamics: The Geopolitical Implications of Green Hydrogen in the Mediterranean
Historically, energy relations between Europe and Mediterranean countries have been characterized by a strong asymmetry. While Mediterranean countries served primarily as suppliers of raw energy resources, Europe maintained control over technology, infrastructure, and value chains, creating an unbalanced power dynamic. This unidirectional flow of resources helped consolidate a geopolitical order in which Mediterranean countries played a predominantly passive role, limited to the supply of energy raw materials. Domestically, overreliance on exports of hydrocarbons led to the emergence of rent-based economies in the region, characterized by limited job creation and industrial diversification. The heavy reliance on hydrocarbon exports not only made these economies particularly vulnerable to energy market volatility but also hindered the development of more sustainable and employment-intensive economic sectors. The transition to green hydrogen offers the opportunity to transform North-South relations in the Mediterranean into a more balanced partnership. However, specific conditions need to be met.[12] To avoid simply replacing oil and gas dependency with hydrogen dependency, this transition requires new frameworks that ensure the development of local value chains, accompanied by technology transfers and industrial capacity building in Mediterranean countries. Investments should focus not just on production facilities but also on developing local expertise, manufacturing capabilities, and research and development centres. This comprehensive approach could stimulate economic growth and create skilled jobs while improving the region’s energy and technological infrastructure. For Europe, this transition means not only access to clean energy but also enhanced energy security through diversified supply sources in an increasingly uncertain geopolitical context.
At the same time, Europe must avoid the risk of recreating energy dependencies. While geographic proximity and abundant renewable resources make southern Mediterranean countries natural partners for Europe’s hydrogen strategy, excessive concentration of supply could recreate vulnerabilities like those exposed by Europe’s previous dependence on Russian gas. Therefore, Europe’s hydrogen import strategy should prioritize diversification of supply sources and support the development of multiple production hubs across different regions.
2.2. Building the Green Hydrogen Future: Technical Challenges and Infrastructure Requirements
The development of green hydrogen infrastructure in the Euro-Mediterranean region faces significant technical and economic challenges that must be carefully managed to ensure a successful energy transition. While the basic process of producing green hydrogen through water electrolysis is well established[13], scaling up production to a commercial level presents numerous obstacles.
Currently, production costs in the EU range from €2.51 to €11.94 per kilogram, depending on factors such as electricity prices and electrolyser efficiency.[14] Electrolysers remain highly energy-intensive, consuming approximately 60 kWh per kilogram of hydrogen produced.[15] Compared to the 2030 targets set in the European strategy (40 GW of electrolysis capacity), recent estimates indicate that announced projects more than double this goal, with 154 projects (equivalent to 70.6 GW) expected to become operational between 2026 and 2030. The most active European countries in this sector are Germany, Spain, the Netherlands, Denmark, and the United Kingdom, each with announced electrolysis capacities exceeding 10 GW by 2030.[16]
Beyond production challenges, hydrogen’s unique physical properties require significant infrastructure adaptations. Its small molecular size increases the risk of leakage, while its interaction with certain metals can cause hydrogen embrittlement, necessitating substantial pipeline modifications.[17] Adapting existing natural gas infrastructure requires replacing carbon steel components with hydrogen-compatible materials such as stainless steel or composite polymers.[18] Additionally, hydrogen’s lower energy density compared to natural gas necessitates higher flow rates and pressures, requiring extensive compressor modifications.[19]
The project of conversion of the TransMed pipeline – which connects Algeria to Sicily via Tunisia – exemplifies these infrastructure challenges. With estimated costs between €6 billion and €8 billion and a projected completion timeline of seven years, the project involves comprehensive material replacements, compressor upgrades, and rigorous safety testing.[20] This aligns with other major hydrogen infrastructure initiatives like the SoutH2 Corridor, a 3,300 km dedicated hydrogen pipeline corridor connecting North Africa, Italy, Austria, and Germany. The SoutH2 Corridor project demonstrates the feasibility of large-scale infrastructure conversion, with over 65% of its infrastructure being repurposed from existing pipelines to enable cost-effective transportation.
The European Hydrogen Backbone (EHB) project, of which the SoutH2 Corridor is a part, aims to create a pan-European hydrogen network by converting existing infrastructure. The SoutH2 Corridor alone could deliver more than 40% of the REPowerEU import target with its 4 Mtpa hydrogen import capacity from North Africa.[21] This project, expected to be fully operational by 2030, showcases practical implementation of these innovations, particularly in its Italian H2 Backbone component, which will enable the transport of 448 GWh/day from North Africa and export 168 GWh/day to Austria and beyond. It demonstrates both the scale of necessary modifications and the potential impact of successful conversion projects, even considering the emerging innovative solutions like the EU-funded HyTechCycling project: it is developing recycling technologies for electrolysers, reducing dependence on critical materials such as platinum and iridium.[22] Moreover, joint research initiatives between European universities and southern Mediterranean research institutes are exploring new hydrogen storage technologies, including metal hydride-based materials, which could revolutionize hydrogen storage and distribution methods.[23]
Another promising area of innovation is bio-hydrogen, which is gaining attention due to its negative carbon footprint (up to -21.9 kg CO2 per kilogram of hydrogen when combined with carbon capture and storage).[24] This technology could complement green hydrogen production by utilizing organic waste and biomass, reducing overall hydrogen costs while enhancing sustainability. Parallel alternative energy transport solutions are also being developed, such as the Xlinks submarine cable project connecting Morocco to the United Kingdom. Although not specifically designed for hydrogen, it demonstrates innovative approaches to renewable energy transport.[25]
The transformation of existing infrastructure and the development of new energy routes go beyond technical considerations, involving broader geopolitical implications. While trans-Mediterranean pipelines have historically played a crucial role in natural gas transport, their conversion for green hydrogen transport—even at a reduced percentage through blending—could profoundly redefine power dynamics between Europe and North Africa.[26]
This transition requires strong political leadership and strategic oversight, which becomes particularly crucial given the increasing involvement of non-European powers, especially China, in regional energy infrastructure development. China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is already financing key energy projects in North Africa, adding another layer of complexity to planning and implementation.[27] A key challenge for the European Union (EU) is enhancing its competitiveness in the global hydrogen economy. Unlike China, the EU lacks a native technological base that would allow it to be fully autonomous in this market. Developing such technologies is essential to securing a strategic advantage and reducing dependence on external actors.
A more balanced EU-North Africa partnership is needed to prevent a scenario where North African countries opt to purchase Chinese technology and develop infrastructure without European involvement. While green hydrogen can help reduce dependency on China for energy needs, the EU still requires access to critical materials, such as rare earth elements, and key supply chains for renewable technologies, including solar panels.
Moreover, to ensure a successful and sustainable green hydrogen market in the Euro-Mediterranean region, three key elements must be prioritized:
Finally, a dedicated investment fund is necessary to secure the creation of new supply chains and strengthen cooperation with North African partners, while aligning European interests with the United States. Additionally, investments in software and artificial intelligence (AI) solutions will be crucial for optimizing energy systems and infrastructure planning and monitoring.
By integrating these strategies, the Euro-Mediterranean region can position itself as a global leader in the hydrogen economy, ensuring both economic resilience and energy security in the long run. At the same time, a strategic approach to technological development and supply chain security will be essential for the EU to maintain its geopolitical and economic influence in the region.
Increasing Chinese investment in Mediterranean infrastructure, particularly in maritime facilities[28], creates a complex competitive landscape that requires careful strategic response. China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is already financing key energy projects in North Africa, adding another layer of complexity.[29] Nevertheless, the EU remains a key economic player in the Mediterranean, with substantial foreign direct investments (FDI) exceeding $300 billion annually since the mid-2010s. In recent years, Europe’s primary focus has been on managing migration flows, as evidenced by agreements with Turkey, Tunisia, and Egypt. Indeed, the ongoing geopolitical and socio-economic challenges in the MENA region have complicated the EU’s ability to play a significant political role, further complicated by authoritarian shifts in many countries after the 2011 uprisings.[30] To maintain its leading economic role, the EU will need to recalibrate its strategies in the Mediterranean, using the potential offered by the energy and digital transitions – as well as the development of green hydrogen markets – as a tool to reconfigure its relations with the countries in the southern shore.
The European Green Deal establishes targets of 6 GW of renewable hydrogen electrolysers by 2024 and 40 GW by 2030, supported by a €470 billion investment allocation through 2050.[31] However, current PNIEC targets represent just 1.6% of total potential hydrogen demand and 2.9% of associated electrolysis capacity, while announced projects cover only 50% of these limited targets.[32] This gap between ambition and implementation reflects deeper structural challenges in market development.
The EU has established several mechanisms to bridge this gap. One of these is the European Clean Hydrogen Alliance, which coordinates investments in production facilities, infrastructure development, and technical standardization[33].
The 2024 Mediterranean Green Week introduced new financial commitments, including €8.5 billion in EIB sovereign loans and €1.5 billion in private investment guarantees. This evolution toward blended financing represents a significant shift in funding approaches but raises questions about market accessibility and coordination.
Market development projections show significant potential – Egypt’s green hydrogen industry alone could contribute $10-18 billion to the country’s GDP by 2030, creating over 100,000 jobs.[34] However, realizing this potential requires addressing several critical challenges. The Energy & Strategy project of the Politecnico di Milano School of Management identifies three viable supply chain configurations: on-site production, centralized production via Power Purchase Agreement (PPA), and hydrogen valley approaches.[35] Each model’s success depends on specific contextual factors including geographical location, renewable energy availability, and consumption profiles.
The institutional framework has also been strengthened through initiatives like the MED-GEM network, established in 2023 to bridge expertise gaps between Europe and the southern Mediterranean.[36]
The Green Growth (GG) initiative, while mobilizing €24 billion for flagship projects in the Mediterranean, has not yet fully integrated or aligned with past initiatives like InfraMed Infrastructure.[37] In the energy sector, transformative projects like ELMED, linking Tunisia with the EU, and GREGY, connecting Greece and Egypt, are crucial. Additionally, plans for a Southern Hydrogen Corridor and the Medlink Project highlight the EU’s commitment to green hydrogen development in the region, underscoring its potential for driving economic growth and energy security.[38]
In transport, GG has focused investments on infrastructure rehabilitation, exemplified by railway projects in Morocco and Egypt. The creation of a Global Maritime Green Corridor also demonstrates the EU’s commitment to promoting green shipping, which is essential for the sustainability of Mediterranean trade. Similarly, the EU’s funding of the MEDUSA project[39] aims to enhance digital connectivity by creating a fibre-optic network between key Mediterranean countries, strengthening both regional connectivity and the digital economy.
Critics argue that the GG initiative is just a rebranding of existing EU efforts, such as the ELMED project, rather than a truly new approach. Furthermore, the EU has not yet taken a leadership role in port and logistics investments in the Mediterranean, despite the strategic importance of this sector.[40] The European Parliament’s recent adoption of a resolution on a comprehensive European port strategy reflects the urgency of aligning the EU’s efforts with broader geopolitical dynamics in the region.[41]
More in general, the analysis reveals four critical areas requiring policy intervention to advance Mediterranean hydrogen development:
1. Strategic targets must be recalibrated to align with infrastructure development realities, incorporating staged implementation milestones for each supply chain configuration;
2. Infrastructure planning must integrate renewable energy development with hydrogen production capacity, establishing clear frameworks for public-private partnerships;
3. Financial instruments need refinement based on early market responses, with specific mechanisms to support broader market participation, particularly among SMEs;
4. Regional cooperation frameworks must be strengthened to coordinate effectively across different supply chain models while supporting local capacity development.
The success of the EU’s Mediterranean hydrogen strategy will ultimately depend on balancing technical requirements, market dynamics, and geopolitical considerations. While the current framework indicates significant ambition, achieving meaningful market development requires a more nuanced understanding of implementation challenges and stronger coordination mechanisms across the region. Moreover, the increasing involvement of non-European powers, particularly China, calls for more decisive strategic responses to ensure that the EU can maintain its position as a key player in the region’s energy transition and security.[42] A commitment that requires stronger and more concrete joint actions with the states leading the energy evolution, starting from two key drivers: ensuring the region’s security and focusing on industrial and infrastructure development.
This is evidenced by Italy’s engagement in the IMEC project and sharing of vision on several global and regional issues, first of all the approach to the “energy transition based on technological neutrality and network interconnections and the development of data centres and joint initiatives for sustainable progress in Africa” discussed with the Saudi Crown Prince and Prime Minister bin Salman[43] also in the context of the relations between the European Union and the Gulf Cooperation Council. Similar objectives are pursued through the cooperation in the energy and interconnections sectors discussed with the President of the United Arab Emirates, Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan[44] However, these efforts should not underestimate the potential influence of the “Trump effect” on IMEC’s trajectory, particularly regarding the anticipated normalisation between Israel and Saudi Arabia: Trump’s past role in the Abraham Accords and his declared intent to de-escalate regional tensions could significantly shape the initiative’s progress. Attention should also be paid to ongoing challenges such as possible Iran’s destabilising actions which remain an obstacle to Mediterranean stability and projects like IMEC.[45]
Green hydrogen is reshaping Euro-Mediterranean energy relations, transforming what was once a dependency-based system into a more dynamic and interconnected partnership. With the complete cessation of Russian gas transit through Ukraine and the full implementation of the REPowerEU strategy, Europe has not only diversified its energy imports but has fundamentally redefined its approach to external energy partnerships. In this evolving landscape, North Africa and the Eastern Mediterranean have emerged as pivotal players, offering not only new sources of energy but also the potential for industrial and technological collaboration that could reposition the entire region within the global hydrogen economy.
However, this transition must be carefully managed to avoid replacing one form of dependence with another. For decades, the energy relationship between Europe and North Africa has been defined by an asymmetry in which Mediterranean countries acted primarily as raw energy suppliers, while Europe controlled the technological, infrastructural, and regulatory frameworks. The rise of green hydrogen offers an opportunity to shift towards a more balanced, integrated economic model where Mediterranean countries actively participate in the value chain rather than merely exporting resources. Yet, while green hydrogen has the potential to reduce Europe’s dependence on fossil fuels, it also exposes the continent to a different kind of vulnerability. Unlike China – and despite great efforts and investments in hydrogen hubs and dedicated infrastructure by private leaders – the European Union does not have a fully developed industrial base for hydrogen production and transport, which risks putting European companies at a disadvantage in an increasingly competitive market. Without targeted investments in electrolysis, storage solutions, and digital infrastructure, Europe risks falling behind, especially in regions like North Africa where China has already established a strong presence through the Belt and Road Initiative.The challenge is clear: if North African countries increasingly turn to Chinese technology to develop their hydrogen infrastructure, Europe must ensure it remains a key partner in the region. A more strategic approach to investment and industrial policy is essential, one that strengthens European technological capabilities while fostering balanced partnerships with Mediterranean countries. This means developing an indigenous hydrogen technology sector capable of competing on a global scale, while also securing access to critical supply chains, from rare earth elements needed for renewable energy technologies to the software and artificial intelligence solutions that will optimize future energy systems. To achieve this, Europe must create dedicated financial instruments to support large-scale hydrogen projects in North Africa and ensure that European companies remain central players in this evolving market. The establishment of a Euro-Mediterranean Green Energy Investment Fund could provide the necessary capital to accelerate infrastructure deployment and create a more structured framework for cooperation.
At the same time, hydrogen infrastructure must be rapidly expanded. The adaptation of existing gas pipelines—such as the SoutH2 Corridor and the European Hydrogen Backbone—alongside the development of new hydrogen-specific transport and storage solutions will be crucial to enabling a stable and efficient hydrogen trade. Beyond physical infrastructure, ensuring market stability and transparency will also be decisive. Establishing a Mediterranean Green Hydrogen Market Observatory would help monitor price fluctuations, anticipate market trends, and prevent excessive dependence on a limited number of suppliers. Strengthening regulatory frameworks will be equally important. A harmonized hydrogen certification system between the EU and North African countries is essential to prevent trade barriers and ensure that exported hydrogen meets Europe’s environmental and emissions reduction targets. At the same time, national regulatory frameworks in producing countries must become more transparent to attract long-term investment and avoid distortions caused by excessive state intervention in the energy sector.
Strategic coordination at the regional level also requires a step change. While platforms such as the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) and MED-GEM provide a foundation for cooperation, they currently lack the executive authority needed to drive large-scale projects. A Mediterranean Hydrogen Alliance, bringing together public and private stakeholders, could help align investment strategies and promote joint research initiatives. At the same time, Europe must avoid over-reliance on a small number of hydrogen suppliers. Diversifying imports beyond North Africa, by integrating supplies from the Gulf, Latin America, and Australia, will help mitigate geopolitical risks and prevent new forms of dependency. Meanwhile, the development of strategic storage hubs across Europe would enhance resilience against potential supply disruptions, ensuring that hydrogen can be stockpiled and redistributed efficiently in response to market fluctuations.
Ultimately, the hydrogen transition represents both a challenge and an opportunity for Europe and its Mediterranean partners. If managed effectively, it could lay the foundations for a more balanced and resilient economic relationship, moving beyond the extractive dynamics of the past to a model based on industrial co-development and shared technological progress. However, success will depend on sustained political commitment, significant financial mobilization, and the establishment of robust governance mechanisms to ensure long-term coordination. If the EU wants to emerge as a leader in the global economy of the evolution (and not just transition) of the energy sector, it can certainly bet on hydrogen, provided it acts now, investing in its technological capabilities, ensuring the security of supply chains and strengthening its partnerships with Mediterranean countries in a logic of mutual growth rather than unilateral dependence.
[1]Vladimir Soldatkin and Dan Peleschuk, “Russian gas era in Europe ends as Ukraine stops transit”, Reuters, January 1, 2025.
[2]European Council, “Where Does the EU’s Gas Come From?”, Explainer, March 21, 2024.
[3]EY Global, “Why Africa’s FDI landscape remains resilient”, December 31, 2024.
[4]Connecting Hydrogen MENA, “Revolutionizing Energy Landscapes: A Deep Dive into the Latest Green Hydrogen Projects in MENA (2023)”, Whitepaper, 2023.
[5]Bernhard Lorentz et al., “The Green Hydrogen Economy: Predicting the Decarbonisation Agenda of Tomorrow”, Deloitte Center for Sustainable Progress, May 2023.
[6]Ernest Lee and Gabriele Romeo (eds.), “Global Energy Transitions: Narratives and Sequencing”, Sciences Po Energy Review 1, July 2024.
[7]Maddalena Procopio and Corrado Čok, “Beyond Competition: How Europe Can Harness the UAE’s Energy Ambitions in Africa”, ECFR, June 2024.
[8]European Bank for Reconstruction & Development (EBRD), “Egypt’s National Low Carbon Hydrogen Strategy”. Rev 10, January 9, 2024.
[9]Royaume du Maroc, “Feuille de Route de l’Hydrogène Vert”, 2021.
[10]Oxford Analytica, “Chinese will focus on green energy in North Africa”, Expert Briefings, August 15, 2024.
[11]Maddalena Procopio and Corrado Čok, 2024.
[12]Manfred Hafner, Pier Paolo Raimondi, and Benedetta Bonometti, “Geopolitics of the Energy Transformation in the MENA Region”, in The Energy Sector and Energy Geopolitics in the MENA Region at a Crossroad (pp 341–396), Springer, 2023.
[13]The electrolysis process is whereby electrodes are inserted into water on separate sides of an electrolyte membrane, an electric current flow through the water and breaks the molecules into hydrogen and oxygen. The electricity for electrolysis comes from renewable sources (wind, hydroelectric or solar) and is therefore a carbon- free process, hence the name ‘green hydrogen’.
[14]Energy & Strategy, Politecnico di Milano School of Management, “Hydrogen Innovation Report 2024: Sfide e azioni concrete per lo sviluppo della filiera in Italia”, 2024.
[15]MED-GEM, “The EU & the Green Hydrogen in the Mediterranean: A New Horizon for Cooperation and Investment”, October 13, 2024.
[16]Energy & Strategy, Politecnico di Milano School of Management, 2024.
[17]IRENA, Geopolitics of the Energy Transformation: The Hydrogen Factor, 2022.
[18]Leon Stille, “Securing Critical Materials Across the Mediterranean for the EU’s Renewable Future”, Policy Brief 10/2024, LUISS Institute for European Analysis and Policy, July 29, 2024.
[19]European Commission, “Hydrogen: How the EU Supports Hydrogen Research, Funded Projects, Related Policies and Initiatives”, 2023.
[20]Leon Stille, 2024.
[21]Snam, “South H2 Corridor” (website, Accessed February 2024).
[22]Louis Fletcher et al., “Rethinking Energy Geopolitics: Towards a Geopolitical Economy of Global Energy Transformation”, Geopolitics 30(2): 531-565, 2024.
[23]European Commission, 2023.
[24]Energy & Strategy, Politecnico di Milano School of Management, 2024.
[25]Mohamed Ramadan A. Rezk et al. “Future Scenarios of Green Hydrogen in the MENA Countries: The Case of Egypt”, Insights into Regional Development 5(4): 92- 114, 2024.
[26]IRENA, 2022.
[27]Energy & Strategy, Politecnico di Milano School of Management, 2024.
[28]Luigi Narbone and Abdelkarim Skouri, “A Sea of Opportunities: The EU, China and the Mediterranean Connectivity”, Policy Paper 2024/08, Luiss Mediterranean Platform, 2024.
[29]Ibid.
[30]Ibid.
[31]European Commission, “A Hydrogen Strategy for a Climate-Neutral Europe”, 2020.
[32]Energy & Strategy, Politecnico di Milano School of Management, 2024.
[33]Tomasz Jerzyniak and Anna Herranz-Surrallés, “EU Geoeconomic Power in the Clean Energy Transition”, Journal of Common Market Studies 62(4): 1028–1045, February 15, 2024.
[34]Mohamed Ramadan A. Rezk et al., 2024.
[35]35 Energy & Strategy, Politecnico di Milano School of Management, 2024.
[36]MED-GEM, 2024.
[37]Valeria Lauria, “Investing in the Mediterranean: Strategies for Infrastructure Development”, In IEMed Mediterranean Yearbook 2024 (pp. 79-85), IEMed, 2024.
[38]Council of the EU, “Global Gateway: Council endorses flagship project list for 2025”, Press release, December 2, 2024.
[39]Council of the EU, 2024.
[40]Luigi Narbone and Abdelkarim Skouri, 2024.
[41]Transport & Environment, “Europe-Asia Green Corridors: Case for Morocco as a Green Shipping H2 Hub”, Report, May 2024.
[42]Ibid.
[43]Presidency of the Council of Ministers (Italy), “President Meloni visits Saudi Arabia”, Press Release, January 25, 2025.
[44]Presidency of the Council of Ministers (Italy), “President Meloni visits United Arab Emirates”, Press Release, 15 January 15, 2025.
[45]Decode39, “Italy’s strategic role in the Indo-Med as IMEC regains momentum”, January 23, 2025.
10 March 2025
21 February 2025
8 December 2024