The GCC States’ Security Policies in the Red Sea Geopolitical Border: Factors and Policy Options
For the GCC states, the Red Sea has become a geopolitical border whose security is an integral part of their own stability and national interests, with particular regard to Saudi Arabia. Nevertheless, the GCC states have proved unable to formulate a unified approach to the region, mainly due to different geographical positions, political agendas and intra-GCC competition, threat perceptions, as well as to the complicating effects of global powers’ competition. The Saudi-led Red Sea Council has not achieved significant outcomes, nor has it ensured basic security coordination so far. Currently, the rise of multi-domain security threats to regional and, partly, maritime stability from non-state armed actors active in Yemen, Sudan, Somalia, can push the GCC states towards the elaboration of a more cohesive Red Sea policy. Against this backdrop, the GCC states should opt for maritime- centred, task-focused, practical cooperation initiatives aimed at improving win-win Red Sea security, outside of a comprehensive GCC regional strategy difficult to achieve.
This paper identifies factors supporting and complicating GCC states’ security and peace cooperation in the Red Sea region. It proceeds exploring their security and peace relations with littoral African countries. It concludes framing the strategic scenario ahead to suggest areas for practical security cooperation between the GCC states and the countries bordering the Red Sea.
For the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states[1], the Red Sea region is a neighbourhood due to geographical and historical reasons. Since the 2010s, the Red Sea region has acquired a new prominence, gradually turning into a geopolitical border with polysemic meanings[2] for each of the GCC states.
The Red Sea is a geopolitical border for the GCC states since the monarchies can no longer build their national security strategies[3] without considering the Red Sea region. This is due to some entrenched variables: the rising GCC states’ economic interdependence, triggered by post-oil reforms; the weight of the maritime factor in economic diversification, and the increased, multi-domain security threats coming from the Red Sea. Especially for Saudi Arabia, the Red Sea region has a key role in national perspectives and insecurity perceptions: Riyadh is the only GCC member to share a maritime border with the area. At the same time, the security of the Red Sea neighbourhood, comprising Arab and African states from the Suez Canal to the Bab al-Mandab Strait, is intrinsically dependent on the political dynamics of the Gulf, and of the macro-region comprising Mashreq and the Horn of Africa. This highlights the extreme permeability of the Red Sea region, a vital commercial artery connecting the Mediterranean Sea with the Indian Ocean.
Two recent dynamics have accelerated the GCC states’ interest and involvement in the Red Sea region: the post-hydrocarbon economic diversification (the “Visions”), and the 2015 war in Yemen. From Saudi Arabia’s perspective, “the Houthi takeover of Yemen and subsequent instability on Saudi’s southern maritime border has given the Horn of Africa states renewed importance towards Saudi Arabia[4].” This marked a reassessment of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Qatar and, more broadly, the GCC states policies towards the Red Sea states with Saudi Arabia prioritising diplomatic engagement and the UAE privileging its security interests.
While Saudi Arabia both recognises “the strategic importance of African nations in particular the Horn of Africa on Saudi national security”[5] and has a vision for the Red Sea focused on economic prosperity, investments and infrastructure, it still lacks a comprehensive, cross-regional security strategy able to tackle and mitigate the rising destabilisation of the broader Red Sea context[6].
Meanwhile the UAE, which does not share a border with the region, is pursuing a Red Sea security strategy in line with its national interests and consisting of two intertwined pillars. The first is the presence of Emirati-controlled infrastructures (also dual-use), commercial ports, logistic hubs, and local allies along the Red Sea coasts. The second is a series of security and/or defence agreements with littoral governments and local actors. Ultimately, the Emirati strategy is based on connectivity: Abu Dhabi no longer conceptualises foreign policy bilaterally, but rather as a network of relations and ad hoc cooperation on specific topics. This thinking drives the UAE’s neighbourhood to expand, to eventually include the Red Sea. The Emirati activism in this context not only seeks to project power and advance national interest but also aims to safeguard national security abroad by investing resources in an area of strategic importance to its connectivity policy.
Nevertheless, GCC states’ economic-oriented Visions alone are not sufficient to produce stability in the Red Sea region. As drivers of conflict rise, the GCC states, and especially the bordering Saudi Arabia, need to frame Red Sea security strategies aimed at pursuing national security and interests, in a highly competitive geopolitical context. Since the mid-2010s, regional and international powers (Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, Türkiye, Iran; Russia, China, the United Kingdom, to a lesser extent India), are competing for influence in the Red Sea, vying for the construction and leasing of military bases, security and defence agreements, concessions for operating commercial ports, agreements to build or modernise infrastructure, and investment in agriculture.
Economic competition has played a constructive role in triggering investment, which can positively impact local growth in littoral economies providing the basis for cooperation between Red Sea states and external powers. This competition, however, has also resulted in militarisation, including the proliferation of military bases, defence agreements and support for non-state local groups. A vicious cycle has ensued whereby militarisation has intensified inter-state rivalries and meddling by external powers, comprised the GCC states, in local conflicts. This dynamic has resulted in regional and global rivalries in the Red Sea being perceived locally as a destabilising factor[7].
This policy paper identifies factors which currently support and complicate GCC states’ security and peace cooperation in the Red Sea region. It proceeds exploring how the GCC states have developed security and peace relations with African countries bordering the Red Sea, arguing that Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Qatar have adopted different approaches to collaboration. Then it focuses on the Red Sea Council as the most recent, Saudi-led multilateral framework also comprising a security dimension. The policy paper concludes framing the strategic scenario ahead and suggesting areas for practical security cooperation between the GCC states and the countries bordering the Red Sea.
Among the factors currently supporting GCC states policies in the Red Sea, Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030 can play a role in promoting stabilization and security in the Red Sea neighbourhood, pushing on economic development. To succeed, post-hydrocarbon reforms will require a stable Red Sea, meaning that Riyadh’s interest in its security is bigger than ever before. Saudi Arabia’s western coast is home to many Vision 2030-related projects, including new cities, tourist resorts and infrastructure projects. In 2023, it was announced that two special economic zones (SEZs) were to be established on the Red Sea coast, one in Jizan and King Abdullah Economic City (KAEC), 100 km north of Jeddah. The western coast will also host The Red Sea Project, which involves the construction of Red Sea International Airport in Hanak, Tabuk province, and the development of about 90 islands in the northern Red Sea. The flagship investment in the Red Sea is NEOM, a brand-new futuristic city being built also in Tabuk province, which will stretch from the northern Red Sea to the Gulf of Aqaba and the Jordanian border. NEOM also involves the development of Sindalah island as a luxury destination and the renovation of Duba as NEOM’s commercial port.
Much of the investment is targeted at Saudi Arabia’s geographic peripheries bordering the Red Sea, for example Tabuk and Jizan. While this triggers economic competition with neighbouring commercial ports and Special Economic Zones like Aqaba (Jordan), Eilat (Israel) and Egypt’s Red Sea area, it should also contribute to spreading prosperity because of a broader safe environment. The littoral neighbourhood around NEOM is expected to benefit from the development of economic projects, from the increase of overall commercial volumes and the subsequent stabilising effects that these projects are likely to have.
The Red Sea has entered the Gulf’s security orbit not only for great power competition, but also because of GCC state’s growing economic interests in Africa. A GCC approach to Africa is lacking, because the organisation is not a monolith – each member state adopts its own distinct approach in pursuit of specific interests. Over the last decade, GCC states have collectively invested over $100 billion in Africa, with over 59 billion dollars coming from the UAE, rendering it the fourth largest foreign direct investor in the continent. Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia has provided nearly 26 billion in investment and Qatar just over 7 billion.i Food security and agriculture is a common sector for GCC states to invest in, especially for Saudi Arabia, which has also targeted energy and renewables, infrastructure and industry, and more recently metals and minerals. The UAE has tended to focus on developing commercial ports and infrastructure, especially through DP World and AD Ports Group, for example in Ethiopia, Senegal, Angola, Kenya, and Tanzania. The mining sector has also been an Emirati investment priority in Africa, such as Zambia copper production and other metals in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). While Qatar has concentrated on securing liquified natural gas (LNG) contracts and the aviation sector, with Qatar Airways acquiring a 49% stake in RwandAir and 25% in South African carrier Airlink.
In all cases, rising economic and energy ties tend to be the catalyst for broader GCC-African cooperation, which includes security and defence. This further highlight why the GCC states need to design security strategies in the Red Sea to secure their investments and further influence. For these states, investing in the Red Sea region and, broadly, in Africa means focusing on maritime security to secure trade routes and coasts.
Another factor supporting GCC states’ security cooperation in the Red Sea is the current de-escalation trend in the Horn of Africa between Ethiopia and Somalia. In December 2024, Türkiye brokered an agreement between Ethiopia and Somalia to ensure that Ethiopia gains the access to the sea, but under Somalia’s sovereignty. The deal, whose details are still under discussion, reversed a risky escalation trend between Addis Ababa and Mogadishu started in January 2024, when Ethiopia had signed an agreement with Somaliland for the naval and commercial access to Berbera port, in return for Ethiopia considering recognising Somaliland in the future. Somalia opposed the deal: despite Somaliland declared independence in 1991, it is an autonomous part of the Somali national territory. The dispute quickly triggered alignments and counter-alignments between regional powers: Türkiye and Egypt sided with Somalia, and both approved the deployment of troops in Mogadishu, while the UAE supported Addis Ababa’s decisions. The Berbera port, which is operated by DP World, is key to the Emirati African strategy and its SEZ opened in 2023. Saudi Arabia, which quietly supports Ethiopia’s strategic choices, opted instead for keeping a low profile to maintain its diplomatic influence. Inter-state de-escalation in the Horn of Africa now opens for the GCC states cooperation opportunities with Horn countries, also in the security realm.
Regarding littoral and maritime security, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Qatar have been investing heavily in modernising their navies, even though naval autonomy may be realistically far off. These efforts can contribute to improving maritime security in the Red Sea, as GCC states seek to improve their brown water (littoral) and – in the case of Saudi Arabia and the UAE – their blue water capabilities. Upgrading their navies is not only a sign of GCC states’ naval ambitions in line with increasingly assertive foreign policies. It also demonstrates their awareness of rising maritime threats emanating from Iran and non- state armed actors.In terms of naval power, the decisive challenge that GCC states face is recruiting enough manpower and training enough experts able to operate highly technical weapons systems. By participating in the US-led Combined Maritime Forces (CMF)[8], some Gulf states could transform into autonomous security providers in the long term. The GCC states have kept a low profile in the Red Sea crisis, caused by the Houthis’ attacks against commercial ships, with the notable exception of Bahrain, who joined the US- led mission “Prosperity Guardian” in 2024. This is less a question of naval capacities and strategy and more about political calculations, namely minimising the risk Yemeni Houthis’ retaliatory attacks against their territory, as seen between 2015 and 2022.
On maritime security, the EU’s strengthened ambitions as a maritime security provider indirectly support GCC states’ security policy goals in the Red Sea region. In 2022, as part of the strategic partnership with the Gulf proposed by the European Commission and then endorsed by all EU institutions, the European Commission mentioned maritime security as an area where the EU and GCC should strengthen cooperation to pursue regional stability and global security. This commitment was also highlighted in a joint statement at the first-ever EU-GCC summit, held in Brussels in October 2024. The parties stated that “we aim to develop a joint GCC-EU approach to maritime security in the context of the EU Structured Security Dialogue to address relevant issues in the Red Sea[9].” This ambition builds on recent maritime security initiatives in the western Indian Ocean, including: (since 2019) the European Maritime Awareness in the Strait of Hormuz (EMASoH); (since 2022) the Coordinated Maritime Presence (CMP) in the North-Western Indian Ocean; and (since 2024) the EU-led mission EUNAVFOR Aspides in the Red Sea. GCC states are, with great caution, informally sharing information with Aspides mission[10]. Although GCC decisionmakers perceive EUNAVFOR Aspides as a positive novelty worthy of attention, they consider the EU “a partner” rather than a “maritime security provider,” since the EU is not thought of as capable of securing maritime waterways. It is “too early” to be seen if EUNAVFOR Aspides can shift this thinking and dispel the doubts that [the EU] is an actor out of its league[11].
In such a scenario, mini-lateral frameworks can support GCC states’ security policy goals in the Red Sea, even though such frameworks involve only some of them. The US designated the UAE and India as major defence partners, in 2024 and 2016 respectively. The assembling of a network of ‘super American allies’ in pursuit of connectivity and security goals in the Western Indian Ocean contribute to Red Sea stability, as Emirati and Indian economic, commercial and maritime interests align here. The designation statement frames the Emirati role as a way “to further enhance defence cooperation and security in the Middle East, East Africa, and the Indian Ocean regions”, since its status as a major defence partner “will allow unprecedented cooperation through joint training, exercises, and military- to-military collaboration”, also “between the military forces of the United States, the UAE, and India[12]. The UAE and India already have a comprehensive strategic partnership dating back to 2015 and regularly conduct joint military exercises. And in September 2023, both countries signed up to the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) project, the advancement of which will likely push India – also a member of the I2U2 with the US, UAE and Israel – to commit more to protect the Red Sea, having thus far only focused on the security of the Arabian Sea.
Two Red Sea littoral states, Yemen and Sudan, are currently gripped by civil wars, which greatly reduce GCC states’ security politics goals in the region. In an unstable although not war-torn state of the Red Sea region, Somalia, the rising activity of jihadi groups erodes state’s sovereignty and territorial control: al-Shabaab (an al Qaeda’s affiliate) made significant territorial gains in central regions due to a large-scale operation against the army since early 2025, and the Islamic State-Somalia (IS-S) controls areas of the Puntland’s region of northeast. Both in Yemen and Sudan, conflicts are domestic disputes for power and resources, with strong regional dimensions.
The truce in Yemen, which formally expired in 2022, is still largely holding and in late 2023 the conflictparties initially agreed to a United Nations roadmap for a ceasefire. The conflict originally broke out when the Houthis, a Zaydi armed movement from the northern highlands later known also as Ansar Allah, seized the capital Sana’a between September 2014 and January 2015. The coup prompted the intervention of a Saudi-led coalition of ten Arab states in March 2015.
Meanwhile, in Sudan the conflict is still raging with dire humanitarian consequences. The war started in 2023 as an intra-military standoff between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) led by General Abdel Fattah Al Burhan, and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) headed by Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as Hemedti, a former warlord.
In both Yemen and Sudan, security sector reform (SSR) efforts helped to ignite the conflicts. In 2013, the dismissal of officers still loyal to former Yemeni president Ali Abdullah Saleh, and of Saleh’s elder son and political heir Ahmed Ali as Republican Guard commander, combined with the disbandment of the powerful First Armoured Division by the interim president Abd Rabu Mansour Hadi, favoured the tactical alliance between Ansar Allah and Saleh loyalists. In turn in Sudan, in 2023 the RSF opposed its proposed integration into the armed forces, as requested by the army and civilian groups. The RSF had received the status, and the benefits, of a regular force in 2015, preserving its autonomy.
Despite having domestic causes, both the conflicts have seen the gradual involvement, foreign powers, including from the Gulf. Since 2015 Iran has provided the Houthis with weapons, training and intelligence[13]. A representative of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) also serves on the group’s Jihad Council. In Sudan, Iran has provided the SAF with drones after reestablishing diplomatic relations with Khartoum in 2024 in exchange for relaunching the stalled 2017 deal for a naval base in Port Sudan[14]. The UAE and Qatar were both members of the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen, and the UN considers allegations of Emirati support to the RSF “credible”[15]. Both the SAF and RSF have also sent soldiers to Yemen as Sudan is also a coalition member.
As both Yemen and Sudan are littoral states, protracted instability in these countries hampers Red Sea security. In Yemen, this resulted in Houthis’ attacks against shipping, with Hodeida port as main maritime pivot; in Sudan, fighting has reached Port Sudan, the main coastal city, in mid-2025, due to repeated drone attacks by the RSF against the army. This intertwines with the role of foreign powers in these battlefields.
The Red Sea crisis is likely to continue at least in the medium-term. The subsequent maritime instability will reduce the neighbourhood’s medium-to-long-term growth prospects and hamper cooperation. Even if an end to the war in Gaza took away the proclaimed reason for the attacks, the Houthis learned how to exploit the chokepoint and may resume attacks there in support of their own goals, potentially even to support their war economy. According to the UN, the Houthis are levying illegal tolls from “a few shipping agencies” to grant their ships safe passage through the area, which raises around $180 million per month[16].
Overt Iran-Israel confrontation endangers stability in the Red Sea, with emerging Houthi-driven cooperation between non-state armed actors in the Southern Red Sea (ex. with al-Shabaab), further complicating the picture. The idea is widespread in the GCC that “if you want to address the Red Sea crisis, you must talk with the Iranians”[17]. The Houthis, however, have displayed a maverick attitude and a degree of autonomy from Tehran, which even with détente with Iran may make them difficult to reign in.
Despite the launching of several Western-led military initiatives, a year and half on since the Houthis first launched attacks in the Red Sea, the crisis of Western deterrence is clear, and it also affects GCC states’ stabilization goals in the area. In December 2023, the US-led Operation Prosperity Guardian was launched. The multilateral mission also comprises the UK, Bahrain, Australia, Canada and the Netherlands, and operates under CMF Combined Taskforce (CTF) 153. This was followed in February 2024 by the launch of European-led EUNAVFOR Aspides, including Greece, France, Italy, Belgium, Germany, Spain and Denmark. Both missions have defensive mandates, focused on patrolling, protecting and accompanying vessels. Since January 2024, the US and UK have conducted airstrikes against Houthis’ military sites in northwestern Yemen as part of Operation Poseidon Archer, and between March-May 2025 the US resumed heavy airstrikes against the Yemeni group (Operation Rough Rider), then reaching an uncertain ceasefire with the Houthis. So far US’ airstrikes have failed to significantly degrade the offensive capabilities of the group. The Houthis have continued to launch missiles and drones against Israel, which often retaliates in Yemen.
The question of how states can manage the threats posed by non-state armed actors is critical but so far remains unaddressed[18]. In terms of weaponry, the Houthis can undermine maritime security in the Red Sea through employing missiles, drones, water-borne improvised explosive devices (WBIED), sea mines, and hijacking. The implications of this threat are multidimensional, from disrupting trade routes to the necessary re-routing of humanitarian aid as well as environmental risks. EUNAVFOR Aspides, “persistence” in countering these threats is key to improve the mission’s effectiveness, but its aim should also include efforts to shape “naval diplomacy” through stricter cooperation with GCC states[19], building upon experiences, although informal, of intelligence sharing fostered by the Red Sea crisis.
Signs are emerging of growing cooperation between non-state armed actors in the Southern Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, hamperingGCC states’ security prospects in the region. The Houthis are driving these efforts seeking to build their own “network of resistance”[20] to diversify alliances, weapons’ provision and routes, finances, aimed at complementing, not replacing, support from Iran. Their main goal is preserving strategic autonomy now that they are more integrated in the Iran-led “axis of resistance”. In 2024, the Houthis intensified cooperation with armed groups outside of the Iranian axis, including the Somali Al Qaeda-affiliate, al-Shabaab, and Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), actors which “all benefit from a developing nexus of shared interests”, with weapons smuggling as top interest[21]. According to the UN, the Houthis and al-Shabaab have “increased smuggling activities”[22] involving small arms and light weapons, suggesting a common supplier, namely Iran. This follows US intelligence reports suggesting the Houthis are in talks with al-Shabaab to deliver drones[23]. The UN mentions that the Yemeni group is also pursuing an “opportunistic alliance” with AQAP in Yemen, which involves exchanging prisoners and halting fighting along frontlines, mainly in Al Bayda. The report states that “the two groups coordinate operations directly with each other” against the Yemeni government since early 2024[24].
These efforts emphasise the Houthis’ pragmatism in brokering alliances, seeing that they are cooperating with Sunni groups. However, it is yet to be seen whether this emerging cooperation will materialise into an operational arrangement capable of further undermining maritime security in the Red Sea.
The more the GCC states’ economic interests in the Red Sea region rise, the more these countries are going to be active in diplomacy and security and, likely, in possible peacekeeping operations in the future, due to the need to keep/restore stability in the area.
Since the 2000s, the GCC states have played distinct roles in peace and security in the Red Sea. Qatar was the first to commit to diplomacy and conflict resolution: Doha mediated in Yemen’s “Saada wars” in 2007, fought between the Houthis and the army, and in Sudan and the Darfur region in 2008. Also, in 2010-2017 Qatar deployed military observers along the Eritrea-Djibouti border to monitor the ceasefire. Doha withdrew its troops in 2017 during the GCC crisis.
Regarding diplomatic activism, Saudi Arabia and the UAE followed suit in late 2010s, when Riyadh and Abu Dhabi brokered a peace agreement between Ethiopia and Eritrea, signed in Jeddah in 2018. After the deal, Saudi Arabia hosted Eritrea-Djibouti talks to resolve their border dispute. In 2022, Riyadh started talks with the Houthis to achieve a ceasefire in Yemen, and a year later hosted talks between Sudan’s RSF and SAF in Jeddah.
Meanwhile the UAE has been the most active in pursuing security and military cooperation in the Red Sea neighbourhood. Emirati security engagement prioritises counterterrorism and anti-piracy. For this reason, it provides military training where it considers these foci the more urgent, such as Somalia, Puntland, Somaliland, and Ethiopia. In countries where the UAE has sizeable economic investments, it concentrates on defence industry and arms provision, bolstering the security apparatus of allied governments to secure Emirati national interests abroad. For example, in Somaliland, the Emirati training program for the local police followed DP World’s concession for Berbera port in 2016: this is part of a wider 2017 deal to build a military airport in Berbera, which later became a civilian installation.
In the security-military field, the UAE is unmatched by Saudi Arabia and Qatar so far, with a specific attention to military training cooperation and coastal and maritime security on both Red Sea shores. The UAE signed a security agreement with Somalia in 2023, centred on counterterrorism cooperation and institutional capacity-building; the UAE also funds and trains the Somali military police. In 2023, the UAE carried out its first publicly reported airstrike against al-Shabaab in Somalia. In 2024, 18 soldiers, including three from the UAE and one from Bahrain, were killed and 20 others, including two Emiratis, were injured due to an al-Shabaab’s attack in Mogadishu, at a military facility run by the Emiratis. In 2023, the UAE and Ethiopia signed a memorandum to fight terrorism, with the Emiratis providing training to the Ethiopian Republican Guard. Since 2012, the UAE has been training, equipping and funding the Puntland Maritime Police Force (PMPF), headquartered in Bosaso, a major seaport located in the southern Gulf of Aden. Between 2015 and 2019, the UAE trained, equipped and salaried several armed groups in Yemeni coastal regions, including the Security Belt Forces, National Resistance Forces, Hadhrami Elite Forces, Giants Brigades, and the Shabwa Defence Force. It also organised ground offensives against AQAP. Therefore, the Emirati engagement in Yemen encapsulated almost all the dimensions of UAE’s security presence in the Red Sea region, from training and capacity building to weapons provision and funding, with a focus on counterterrorism and maritime security.
The Red Sea Council represents the Saudi attempt to provide a multilateral framework to the region, also encompassing a security dimension. Established in 2020 by Saudi Arabia, the Council of Arab and African Coastal States of the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, also known as the Red Sea Council, includes Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, Sudan, Yemen, Eritrea, Somalia and Djibouti. The founding charter, which establishes the headquarters in Riyadh, stresses security cooperation to tackle piracy, smuggling, and emerging maritime threats. In addition to security, the Red Sea Council deals with economic development, environmental and social issues to strengthen the stability of the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa. When it was launched, Saudi Arabia emphasised there was no intention “to build any new military force”, but to push for “collective coordination”[25].
The Red Sea Council was originally an Egyptian idea. Between 2017 and 2018, Egypt suggested the creation of an informal Red Sea forum to promote economic, development and infrastructural collaboration between Arab and African shores. The proposal was gradually endorsed by Saudi Arabia, who transformed the would-be forum into a Saudi-driven, structured and security-oriented council. Riyadh invested in the Red Sea Council to strengthen its Red Sea policy, during a period of rising regional and international competition in the neighbourhood.
The UAE’s exclusion from the council was likely due to Saudi Arabia’s interest in countering the Emirati influence in the Red Sea, which reached its peak just in 2020. The additional exclusion of Ethiopia was likely the political price Riyadh paid for Egypt’s participation in the rebranded Saudi initiative, given Egypt-Ethiopia long-time political tensions due to the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD).
Five years on its launch, the Red Sea Council has not achieved significant outcomes, nor it has established basic coordination among participants, especially at a security level. Furthermore, the Council seems now to have lost momentum, holding infrequent meetings and rarely appearing in the media. Moreover, the Council was mute when Houthis’ attacks on international shipping disrupted trade flows in the Red Sea, with implications for littoral economies. Saudi Arabia may have reduced its political interest in the same Red Sea initiative it launched given, quite paradoxically, the eruption of Houthis’ attacks in the Red Sea. In front of the crisis, Riyadh has prioritized national security over multilateral efforts aimed at deconfliction, likely to minimize retaliation risks against its own interests and territory. The apparent declining interest of the Saudis may also be related to the fact that Tiran and Sanafir, the islands at the entrance of Gulf of Aqaba once administered by Egypt, have in the meantime become formally part of the kingdom’s territory, appearing in Saudi official maps since 2023. This allows Riyadh to control further territories -apt for hosting outposts- which are critical for freedom of navigation and close to the nascent NEOM. Furthermore, the Saudi control on Tiran and Sanafir allows the kingdom to balance growing regional powers’ investments in the Red Sea region. For instance, in 2024 the UAE invested 35 billion dollars in the development project of Ras El-Hekma in Egypt (on the Mediterranean Sea). a high-spending agreement that could be hypothetically used by the UAE to access, in the future, Egyptian’s bases (for instance, Berenice in the Red Sea).
Among the Council’s member states, Jordan could potentially be interested in reviving the Red Sea Council due to security reasons: the Aqaba port has been notably affected by the re-routing of trade in the Red Sea. Each proposal, however, coming from Jordan would need the political backing of Saudi Arabia, since Amman would not act on this issue autonomously from Riyadh, given strong economic and security ties.
For the GCC states, the Red Sea has become a geopolitical border whose security is an integral part of their own stability and national interests. Nevertheless, the GCC states have proved unable to formulate a unified approach to Red Sea security, mainly due to different geographical positions, political agendas and threat perceptions among Riyadh, Abu Dhabi and Doha. Saudi Arabia displayed a vision for the Red Sea based on economic investments while lacking a comprehensive security strategy; conversely, the UAE showed a military-oriented approach to the region, putting national interests at first. For these reasons, the elaboration of a GCC “one-policy” towards the Red Sea looks a remote scenario, at least in the medium-term.
Furthermore, the GCC states -with the notable exception of Bahrain- displayed a low-profile posture vis-à-vis the Red Sea crisis, prioritising national security concerns (related to the possible Houthis’ retaliation against their territories), on trying to mitigate the economic effects of the crisis through the participation to multilateral naval missions. Regarding maritime security, the diplomatic potential of Oman, which brokered a US-Houthi ceasefire in May 2025, could be explored. Oman could be well placed to identify new resources and cooperation formats, even though the sultanate’s port infrastructures have been limitedly affected, but not untouched, by the crisis, due to its Indian Ocean exposure[26].
The broader Red Sea will not achieve stability as long as conflicts in Yemen and Sudan, and instability in Somalia, are ongoing, and both contexts are vulnerable to more regional and international interference. Through controlling Yemen’s main Red Sea port, Hodeidah, the Houthis can generate
consistent revenues and, since the 2022 truce eased restrictions for the entrance of vessels, also receiving weapons from Iran. So far, the Houthis have succeeded in keeping territorial control on the Red Sea coast despite heavy US’ airstrikes and occasional Israeli ones. Meanwhile, the emerging
destabilisation of Port Sudan, due to the RSF’s drone attacks, adds further uncertainty on the Red Sea coastline. Furthermore, the potential transformation of Port Sudan into a Russia-Iran military hub would further swing the geopolitical pendulum of the region eastwards.
The fall of the Assad regime indirectly affects the balance of power in the Red Sea. In fact, Russia relocated its military assets in eastern and southern parts of Libya and plans to do it in Sudan. The project of a Russian military base in Port Sudan, which regained momentum in 2025, could likely pave
the way for military cooperation with Iran, which has recently stepped-up support for the Sudanese army and signed, in early 2025, a partnership agreement with Russia also comprising joint military drills and intelligence sharing. Also, Türkiye’s strategic gains in Syria could further embolden Ankara’s pursuit of economic and diplomatic influence to Libya, Somalia and the Horn of Africa more widely (building upon the Ethiopia-Somalia agreement).
Setbacks in Gaza, southern Lebanon and Syria have rendered Iran’s “forward defence” weaker than ever before. This paradigm crisis could push Tehran to focus its attentions on the Red Sea, amid waning Western influence, and the proliferation of non-state actors willing to pragmatically cooperate with
each other.
China and India are intently observing the breakdown of maritime security in the Red Sea. While New Delhi has deployed its navy to the Arabian Sea to autonomously contribute to anti-piracy operation, Beijing looks more hesitant to adopt a proactive security role in the Red Sea. China remains torn
between the limits of its diplomatic brokering between Saudi Arabia and Iran, and its willingness to capitalise on failed US efforts to restore maritime deterrence.
In the Red Sea region, the rise of state fragmentation, non-state armed actors, and security threats coming from coastal areas represents a challenge to the GCC states’ interests in the region, and now can push these countries towards the elaboration of a more cohesive Red Sea policy. Against this backdrop and taking GCC states’ individual approaches to the Red Sea into account, the Arab capitals of the Gulf should opt for task-focused, practical cooperation initiatives aimed at improving win-win Red Sea security, which ultimately means securing the Gulf neighbourhood, outside of a comprehensive regional strategy difficult to achieve.
Among possible topics, the GCC states could explore joint initiatives on the reconstruction of the Yemeni Coast Guard (YCG), on tailored training to the Horn of Africa’s Coast Guards (and navies when present), and on the countering of weapons smuggling, partnering with local actors and international stakeholders. These issues are also deeply interrelated.
Since 2017, Saudi Arabia and the UAE cooperate in the rebuilding of the YCG, in the Southern areas formally controlled by the government (Mokha, Aden, Mukalla and Al Ghayda)[27]. In late 2024, the UK announced a new support package for the YCG, comprising fast patrol boats, training, and assistance, as part of the “Yemen Maritime Security Partnership”, a UK-led multinational body launched at the UN. The US reiterated many times its commitment to support the Coast Guard. The YCG already joined the Red Sea Project, an EU-funded programme to enhance maritime security and safety, jointly delivered by the International Maritime Organization (IMO), the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Interpol, and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD).
However, internationally funded programs by the UNDP-UNODC have focused on the reactivation of the Coast Guard in Aden and Mocha in the Bab al-Mandab so far, even though the Arabian sea is a key route for the entrance of smuggled weapons from Iran to Yemen. The GCC states should focus on harmonizing different projects, and partners, to better achieve shared goals. Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, and also Red Sea actors as Egypt and Jordan are part of the US-led Combined Maritime Forces. The Task Force 154 (maritime security training) could provide tailored training to the Horn of Africa’s coast guards and navies to develop specific skills useful to tackle the most pressing issues each country face, starting from weapons smuggling. This mechanism would be similar to NATO’s partnerships like the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI), where Gulf’s partners can choose among a variety of possible practical activities.
In latest years, regional and international competition in the Red Sea, also joined by Saudi Arabia, Qatar and most of all the UAE, has not resulted in increased stability. Furthermore, the militarisation trend triggered by competing players, also within the GCC, has failed to secure the neighbourhood. For the GCC states, this lesson can be useful now that the Red Sea region, representing their geopolitical border, is increasingly destabilised by a combination of state crises, civil wars, and armed non-state
actors. Since only stability can truly promote a conducive environment for their economy-driven agendas, the GCC states should design cooperation-oriented strategies for Red Sea security, starting from a sharp focus on practical security initiatives involving coastal partners.
[1]The GCC comprises Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain and Oman.
[2]For the notion of “polysemic borders”, see: Harald Bauder, “Toward a Critical Geography of the Border: Engaging the Dialectic of Practice and Meaning”, Annals of the Association of American Geographers 101, no. 5 (2011): 1126-1139.
[3]Abdullah Baabood, “How Gulf States Are Reinterpreting National Security Beyond Their Land Borders”, Malcolm H. Kerr Carnegie Middle East Center, August 1, 2024.
[4]Ghassan Shams, “Assessment of Saudi Policy in the Horn of Africa”, Gulf Research Centre, April 12, 2022.
[5]Op. cit.
[6]Eleonora Ardemagni, “Saudi Arabia Has a Red Sea Vision, Not Yet a Strategy”, The Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington, May 17, 2024.
[7]Author interview: Conversation with a Somali official, Rome, November 2024.
[8]Bahrain (which hosts the CMF HQ), Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE are CMF’s members, like Djibouti and Kenya. The UAE has withdrawn its participation from the CMF in 2023, even though it formally remains a member.
[9]European Council, “First European Union-Gulf Cooperation Council Summit – Joint Statement”, Press release, October 16, 2024.
[10]Author interview: Conversation with an Italian Navy member, Milan, February 2024.
[11]Author interview: Skype conversation with a Brussels-based Gulf expert, October 2024.
[12]The White House Briefing Room, “U.S.-UAE Joint Leaders’ Statement Dynamic Strategic Partners”, Press release, September 23, 2024.
[13]Limited provision of weapons started, according to the UN, in 2009, during the final phase of the Saada wars.
[14]In the Sudan war, Russia has worked to hedge its bets so far, although it looks closer to the Sudanese army.
[15]According to an UN Security Council undisclosed report seen by Reuters, accusations that the UAE had provided military support to
the RSF “several times per week” via Amdjarass in northern Chad are “credible”, while the UAE states that flights delivered humanitarian
aid. See among the others Voice of America (by Reuters), “UN Report Says Ethnic Violence Kills Up to 15,000 in 1 Sudan City”, January
19, 2024.
[16]United Nations Security Council, “Letter dated 11 October 2024 from the Panel of Experts on Yemen addressed to the President of the
Security Council”, S/2024/731.
[17]Author interview: Conversation with a Saudi scholar, Rome, November 2024.
[18]John Raine, “The erratic results of deterrence against non-state armed groups”, The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), April 2, 2024.
[19] Author interview: Conversation with a former officer of the EUNAVFOR Aspides, Rome, November 2024.
[20]Eleonora Ardemagni, “Beyond the Axis: Yemen’s Houthis are Building their ‘Network of Resistance’”, RUSI Commentary, November 18,
2024.
[21]Michael Horton, “Looking West: The Houthis’ Expanding Footprint in the Horn of Africa”, CTC Westpoint 17, no. 11 (December 2024).
[22]United Nations Security Council, “Letter dated 11 October 2024…”, S/2024/731, op. cit.
[23]Katie Bo Lillis, Kylie Atwood and Natasha Bertrand, “US intelligence assesses Houthis in Yemen in talks to provide weapons to alShabaab in Somalia, officials say”, CNN, June 11, 2024.
[24]United Nations Security Council, “Letter dated 11 October 2024…”, S/2024/731, op. cit.
[25]Saudi News Agency (SPA), “Foreign Minister: The Council of Arab and African Coastal States of the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden is a
Joint Action System for Coordination and Cooperation”, January 6, 2020.
[26]Oman is a member of the Indian Ocean Rim Organization (IORA), an inter-governmental organisation formed in 1997 to foster regional
economic cooperation. The UAE, Yemen and Somalia are also IORA members, and Saudi Arabia and Egypt are dialogue partners
[27]Eleonora Ardemagni, “Rebuilding Yemen’s Maritime Forces Hobbled by Internal and External Rivalries”, The Arab Gulf States institute
in Washington, August 6, 2020.
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